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chilling effect of unjustified damage awards, yet the injured plaintiff 
would be afforded the opportunity to vindicate his good name and to be 
compensated for his injured business and reputational interests. The re- 
- sult of this approach would be a more equitable balance between the 
competing interests of freedom of the press and the right of an individual 
to recover for harm to his reputation.58 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court in Gertz set about to clarify the constitutional ramifications 
of libel that have arisen from New York Times and its progeny. This ob- 
jective may not have been achieved as Gertz now presents additional 
problems of determining what type of evidence is competent to establish 
actual injury and how courts will apply the discretion accorded them in 
limiting unjustified jury awards. Rather than being a definitive ruling 
on the state of the law, as Justice Blackmun asserts, Gertz may create con- 
fusion and uncertainty in the law of defamation if courts do not ade- 
quately deal with the new challenges posed by this ruling. 
Constitutional Law -EQUAL PROTECTION -DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
PREGNANCY IS NOT SEX DISCRIMINATION - Geduldig v. Aiello, 41 7 US.  
484 (1 974). 
In a 6-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court held in Geduldigv. 
Aiellol that four California women who were refused state insurance 
benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities were not denied equal protec- 
tion of the laws under the fourteenth amendment.2 Moreover, in the 
opinion of the majority, disparate treatment of pregnant persons vis 2i vis 
nonpregnant persons was not sex discrimination.3 
Carolyn Aiello and three other women, each suffering from a 
pregnancy-related disability,* were denied state disability insurance 
58If the premise that freedom of the press needs more protection than it presently receives is 
rejected, the approach suggested becomes oppressive to the libel victim. As with all balancing 
problems, however, a line must be drawn. The approach detailed represents one believed to 
be equitable to both interests. 
'Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
2"No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, $1. 
3417 U.S. at 496-97 & n.20. 
4The four disability claims consisted of an ectopic pregnancy, a tuba1 pregnancy, 
carriage, and a claim of physical incapacitation. Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 
(N.D. Cal. 1973). 
of the 
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benefits solely because section 2626 of the California Unemployment 
Insurance Code exempted pregnancy-related work losses from coverage 
until 28 days past the termination of pregnancy.5 Contending that the 
exclusion violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend- 
ment, the women brought a class action against the California Depart- 
ment of Human Resources. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the depart- 
ment's enforcement of the exclusion and to compel a reevaluation of 
their insurance claims, arguing before a three-judge federal panel6 that 
they had suffered sex discrimination. The women further asserted that 
sex is a suspect classification requiring a strict judicial scrutiny. Alterna- 
tively, they urged the court to adopt a standard which would be more 
stringent than the rational basis standard of judicial review traditionally 
used in determining the constitutionality of sex discrimination.' Two 
of the three judges found that the exclusion of pregnancy-related dis- 
abilities was not based upon a classification having a rational and sub- 
stantial relationship to a legitimate state interest; the court held that the 
pregnancy exclusion unconstitutionally denied the women equal pro- 
tection of the laws.8 
Shortly before the federal district court's decision, the California 
Court of Appeals in Rentzer v.  California9 construed section 2626 to pro- 
hibit only the payments of benefits for disabilities resulting from normal 
pregnancies.1° The Department of Human Resources called Rentzer to 
5 
"Disability" or "disabled" includes both mental or physical illness and mental or physical 
injury. An individual shall be deemed disabled in any day in which because of his 
physical condition he is unable to perform his regular or customary work. In no case 
shall the term "disability" or "disabled" include any injury or illness caused by or arising 
in connection with a pregnancy up to the termination of such pregnancy and for a period 
of 28 days thereafter. 
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE 5 2626 (West 1972). 
6A three-judge court must be convened whenever an injunction against the enforcement of a 
state statute is sought as a remedy. 28 U.S.C. 5 2281 (1970). 
'Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. at 796. 
8Zd. at 801. 
932 Gal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (2d Dist. Ct. 1973). 
1°Subsequent to the court's interpretation, section 2626 was amended to read: "Disability or 
disabled includes. . . t o  t he  extent specified in  5 2626.2 pregnancy." 
Section 2626.2 was added. It reads: 
Benefits relating to pregnancy shall be paid under this part only in accordance with the 
following: 
(a) Disability benefits shall be paid upon a doctor's certification that the claimant is 
disabled because of an abnormal and involuntary complication of pregnancy, including 
but not limited to: puerperal infection, eclampsia, caesarian section delivery, ectopic 
pregnancy, and toxemia. 
(b) Disability benefits shall be paid upon a doctor's certification that a condition 
possibly arising out of pregnancy would disable that claimant without regard to the 
pregnancy, including but not limited to: anemia, diabetes, embolism, heart disease, 
hypertension, phlebitis, phlebothrombosis, pyelonephritis, thrombophlebitus, vaginitis, 
varicose veins, and venous thrombosis. 
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the court's attention and moved for a reconsideration of its decision in 
light of the state court's construction of the statute. The federal panel 
refused to reconsider, and the Department appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court, in recognition of Rentzer, restricted its decision 
to the issue of nonpayment of benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities.ll 
It rejected the lower court's view that such an exclusion constituted sex 
discrimination violative of the equal protection clause. According to the 
majority, the discrimination was not based on sex, but on the status of 
pregnancy, and was rationally related to the fiscal solvency of the state 
insurance program. l2 
The dissenters, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas, asserted that 
the pregnancy exclusion did constitute sex discrimination and that sex is 
a suspect classification requiring a strict judicial scrutiny.l3 They con- 
cluded that while California had a valid interest in preserving the fiscal 
integrity of its insurance program, that interest was not compelling 
enough to justify the state's use of a suspect classification in its insurance 
plan.14 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, lower state and federal courts 
were divided as to whether discrimination based on pregnancy was a form 
of sex discrimination;l5 however, until 1 97 1 courts usually applied the 
rational basis test to both pregnancy and sex discrimination cases.l6 If 
the classifications drawn were found to be rationally related to the fur- 
therance of either an actual or conjectured state interest, they were up- 
held.l7 Then in 197 1 a unanimous Supreme Court in Reed v .  Reed18 
determined that an Idaho statute giving males preference over females in 
the appointment of inheritance administrators violated the equal pro- 
tection clause. Chief Justice Burger stated: 
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE 5 2626 (West 1972), as amended, (Supp. I, 1974). 
"417 U.S. at 491-92. 
121d. at 496 & n.20. 
l31d. at 503. 
141d. at 504. The state's interest in saving money, by itself, does not justify the use of a sus- 
pect classification. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson 
394 U.S. 618,633 (1969). 
15See Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973); Cohen v. Chesterfield 
County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 397 (4th Cir. 1973); rev'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1973); Hutchison v. 
Lake Oswego School Dist., 374 F. Supp. 1056, 1063 (D. Ore. 1974); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1158-59 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155,157 
(N.D. Ill. 1972); Hansen v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 205,517 P.2d 599,602 (1974). 
16E.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Muller v. 
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
"Cases cited note 16 supra. 
'8404 U.S. 71(1971). 
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The Equal Protection Clause . . . [denies] to States the power to legislate 
that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into 
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective 
of that statute. A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and 
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial 
relation to the object of that legislation . . . ."I9 
Two years after Reed, the Supreme Court in Frontiero v .  R i c h a r d ~ o n ~ ~  
declared unconstitutional a federal statute which provided dependent 
benefits to male Air Force officers, but denied benefits to female officers, 
unless their husbands were in fact dependent upon them for over one- 
half of their financial support. The four justices joining in the Court's 
plurality opinion agreed that classifications based on sex are inherently 
suspect, subject to close judicial scrutiny, and sustainable only if they ad- 
vance compelling state interests21 
The Frontiero plurality based their conclusion on a comparison of the 
characteristic of sex to that of race, and they admitted being influenced 
by recent congressional actions22 such as the passage of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,W the Equal Pay Act of 1 963,24 and the proposed 
Equal Rights Amendment.25 Justice Stewart concurred that the dis- 
crimination was invidious but did not explain his rationale. Justices 
Powell, Burger, and Blackmun joined in the result but based their view 
on the belief that the case should be decided using the standard of ju- 
dicial review enunciated in Reed, reserving for the future the question of 
whether sex should be labeled a suspect classification. They further 
reasoned that the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, if adopted, would 
resolve the issue and hence the plurality had acted prematurely in 
l9Id. at 75-76. 
2041 1 U.S. 677 (1973). 
21Id. at 688. 
22Id. at 686-87. 
2342 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(a) (1970): 
I t  shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. 
2429 U.S.C. 5 206(d) (1970): 
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, 
within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on 
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the 
rate at which he pays to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal 
work. . . . 
25Article 1 of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment reads, "Equality of rights under the 
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex." 
H.R. J. Res. 208,92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 1 (1972). 
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deciding that sex was a suspect classification. 
Following Frontiero, lower courts were divided, not only in determin- 
ing whether discrimination based on pregnancy was sex discrimination, 
but also in deciding the standard of judicial scrutiny to be applied under 
the equal protection clause to sex discrimination ~ases.~6 In  Geduldig, 
both issues were presented to the Supreme Court. 
In a footnote, the Geduldig majority reasoned that the California in- 
surance program was not sex discriminatory. Justice Stewart stated: 
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such 
under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analy- 
sis. The program divides potential recipients into two groups - preg- 
nant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclu- 
sively female, the second includes members of both sexes. The . . . bene- 
fits . . . thus accrue to members of both sexes.27 
The dissenting justices contended that the exclusion did discriminate 
on the basis of sex, arguing that: 
[A] limitation is imposed upon the disabilities for which women workers 
may recover, while men receive full compensation for all disabilities suf- 
fered, including those that affect only or primarily their sex, such as 
prostatectomies, circumcision, and hemophilia and gout. In effect, one 
set of rules is applied to females and another to males.28 
Noting that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had taken 
the same position,29 the minority argued that the crucial difference be- 
tween the pregnancy-related disabilities excluded fiom coverage and 
other disabilities covered by the insurance program was that women suf- 
fered from pregnancy-related disabilities and men did not; hence, Cali- 
- -- 
26See, e.g., Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973); Eslinger v. Thomas, 
476 F.2d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 1973); Johnston v. Hughes, 372 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974); 
Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 205, 517 P.2d 599 (1974); Warshafski v. Journal Co., 63 Wis. 
2d 130,216 N.W. 2d 197 (1974). 
27417 U.S. at 496 n.20. 
28Zd. at 501. 
29In guidelines issued for the interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Commission declared: 
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth and 
recovery therefrom are, for all job related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be 
treated as such under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan 
available in connection with employment. Written and unwritten employment policies 
and practices involving such as the commencement and duration of sick leave, the avail- 
ability of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, re-instate- 
ments and payment under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave 
plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on 
the same terms and conditions as they are to other temporary disabilities. 
29 C.F.R. 5 1064.10(b) (1973). 
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fornia discriminated on the basis of sex.30 
The analysis of the majority in rejecting the plaintiffs' sex discrimina- 
tion contention may be faulted for focusing on the class benefited rather 
than the class denied.31 In Frontiero, for example, all the male officers 
but only some female officers with dependents were eligible for benefits, 
and only the female officers were required to show that they provided 
over one-half of the family support. Thus the class ultimately denied 
dependent benefits consisted only of women, and the Court concluded 
that women were being discriminated against on the basis of sex." Simi- 
larly, in Geduldig the Court confionted a scheme granting benefits to all 
men and some women, and denying benefits to a class consisting only of 
women. However, rather than following the Frontiero rationale which 
found discrimination because only women were denied benefits, the 
Geduldig Court determined that the California coverage drew no sex dis- 
tinctions among the class receiving the benefits and was therefore not 
discriminatory." This emphasis seems contrary to the express language 
of the fourteenth amendment, which provides that no person shall be 
denied the equal protection of the laws. 
The Court offered no explanation for its departure from the ap- 
proach set out in prior decisions,34 and the departure cannot be ex- 
plained in terms of the disability excluded. To  argue that pregnancy- 
related disabilities can be rationally excluded because the individual 
chooses to become pregnant is not persuasive, for California covers other 
disabilities over which the victim has contro1.35 For example, compensa- 
tion is provided for disabilities caused by obesity, a physical condition 
often created by voluntary acts.36 Disabilities resulting from a barroom 
brawl initiated by the disabled are also compensable, as are disabilities 
caused by cosmetic surgery. Even disabilities as a result of a discretionary 
sex change operation are compensated by California's insurance pro- 
g~am.37 Further, the economic effects of pregnancy-related disabilities 
are similar to those of compensated disabilities. Because of pregnancy- 
related disabilities, women require hospitalization, incur medical ex- 
penses, are unable to work, and suffer diminished incomes.38 
30417 US .  at 501. 
3lSee, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 41 1 U.S. 677,678-79 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,75 
(1971); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1968). 
3241 1 U.S. at 678-79. 
33See note 27 supra and accompanying text. 
34See cases cited note 31 supra. 
35417 U.S. at499. 
36Brief for Appellees at 21, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
371d. 
38417 U.S. at 500; nearly two-thirds of all women who work do so out of necessity because 
they are unmarried, or because their husbands earn less than $7,000 annually. 417 U.S. at 
501 n.5, citing WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, WHY WOMEN WORK (Rev. ed. 1972). 
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The Court b class definitions are also subject to criticism. The ma- 
jority posits pregnant persons and women as two separate classes, when in 
fact the class of pregnant persons is a subclass39 within the larger class of 
women." By comparison, it can hardly be doubted that a classification 
which denied benefits to a subclass of blacks (e.g., those with sickle-cell 
anemia)41 while granting them to all whites (including those with other 
forms of anemia) would be unconstitutional racial dis~riminat ion.~~ 
In an attempt to show that women were not discriminated against on 
the basis of sex, the majority noted that women contribute only 28 per- 
cent of the insurance premiums yet receive 38 percent of the benefh43 
California, however, did not establish its insurance program on an ac- 
tuarial basis,44 but structured it to provide a disproportionate share of the 
benefits to those who receive smaller incomes and thus contribute smaller 
premiums.45 Therefore, because wages for women in California average 
only 60 percent of those for men,46 women receive a disproportionate 
share of the insurance benefits. This dividend is not received because 
they are women, but because they are economically less well off. Blacks 
also probably receive a disproportionate share of benefits47 for the same 
reason. The extra benefits received by low-income women employees 
in general cannot be used to excuse the state's refusal to pay benefits to 
women disabled by pregnancy. 
Furthermore, the majority's argument that women are discriminated 
against because they receive a disproportionate share of the benefits pre- 
39There are 105,000,000 women in the United States, and women within the child-bearing 
age make up 43.5 percent of the total female population. The annual fertility rate of women 
within the child-bearing age is 69 births per thousand women. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. 
Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1157-58 (W.D. Pa. 1974). 
40Weuel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (W.D. Pa. 1974). 
41Sickle-cell anemia is a hereditary disease suffered predominantly by blacks. See A. CERAMI 
& E. WASHINGTON, SICKLE CELL ANEMIA 75-81,85-89 (1974). 
42See generally Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 
364 U.S. 339 (1960); Hall v. St. Helena Parrish School, 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd 
mem., 368 U.S. 515 (1962). 
43417 U.S. at 497 n.21. In other words, women receive $1.36 in benefits for every dollar they 
contribute to the insurance program. 
44The contribution rate for a particular group of employees is not tied to that group's rate of 
disability claims. Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. at 800. See also, CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE 
Q 2655 (West 1972). 
45The full-time year-round employee making $50 per week is eligible for $31 per week in 
benefits or replacement of 62 percent of weekly wage loss. The $100 per week employee gets 
$57 weekly, or a 57 percent replacement. The $200 per week employee gets $105 per week or 
52.5 percent replacement, and workers making more than $200 also get $105 or less than 50 
percent of the weekly wage loss. Brief for Appellees, supra note 36, at 19-20. 
aSee WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 106 
(1973). 
47Blacks receive smaller incomes than whites and would therefore receive a larger percentage 
of the benefits. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION 
REPORT SERIES p. 60, NO. 85,533-35 (1971). 
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sumes that the classification at issue is male-female and is therefore in- 
consistent with their prior assertion that the classification is pregnant- 
nonpregnant. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Geduldig, the majority's conclusion that the exclusion of pregnancy- 
related disabilities was not sex discrimination avoided the necessity of 
specifying the standard of judicial review to be applied in future sex dis- 
crimination litigation. The dissenters, however, asserted that strict 
scrutiny should be applied in all such ~ases .~8 The dissenters' position 
is arguably incorrect. 
Under the traditional analysis, a classification must undergo strict ju- 
dicial scrutiny if the Supreme Court has declared that the right infringed 
is a fundamental right or that the basis of classification is s~spect.~g Al- 
though procreation has been established as a fundamental right,50 here 
California has not prohibited persons from exercising the right to pro- 
create; it has merely refused to pay for the normal bearing of children. 
Traditionally, states have been given great leeway in structuring their 
social programs to meet constitutional  standard^.^^ As the majority in 
Geduldig correctly stated, "There is nothing in the Constitution . . . 
that requires the State to subordinate . . . its . . . interests solely to create 
a more comprehensive social insurance program than it already has. "52 
It is difficult to base a strict standard of judicial scrutiny on the presence 
of procreation as a factor in the case. 
The creation by a state of a suspect classification can also trigger a strict 
standard of review. However, a clear majority of the Supreme Court has 
never labeled disparate treatment on the basis of sex a suspect classifica- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  Classifications have typically been labeled suspect when they im- 
pact on persons who are relatively powerless to protect their interests in 
the political pr0cess.5~ Whether this is true of women, or of pregnant 
women, is arguable, but only four members of the Court were convinced 
of the proposition in Frontiero. 
Even if a strict standard is inapplicable, this does not mean that the 
sex discrimination in Geduldig can be constitutionally justified. The 
Reed decision requires that disparate treatment of the sexes must rest 
4*417 US.  at 503. 
49See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 1 U.S. 1 ,  40, 97-98 (1972); 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-43 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 
(1971). 
soskinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942). 
51Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549-51 (1972); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 
483,489 (1955). 
52417 U,S. at 496. 
53Fo~r Justices have done so, however. Frontiero v. Richardson, 41 1 U.S. 677 (1973). 
54See Graham v. Richardson, 404 U.S. 365,372 (1971). 
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upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to 
a legitimate state interest.55 In Geduldig, the Court determined that the 
pregnancy exclusion was reasonably related to California's interest in 
prohibiting burdensome contributions from the empl0yed.~6 It is doubt- 
ful, however, that the increased premium costs necessary to provide cover- 
age for pregnancy-related disabilities would have been burdensome. 
Cost estimates for extending coverage to pregnancy-related disabilities 
varied between 49 and 1,31 million dollars,57 but even by accepting the 
most expensive estimate, the state could have covered pregnancy by in- 
creasing the employee contribution rate from 1 percent to 1.364 percent 
of the employee's salary and by raising the premium ceiling from $85 to 
$1 19.58 For example, an employee who earned $5,000 annually would 
have had to pay $1.50 in additional premiums per month;59 the largest 
possible increase for any worker would have been $2.83 per month.G0 
Thus, under the majority's argument California can exclude women from 
insurance coverage for normal pregnancy-related disabilities in order to 
save the average worker less than $2.83 per month. 
The majority also asserted that the state has valid interests in main- 
taining a self-supporting program and in maintaining present benefit 
coverage.61 However, by moderately increasing the insurance premiums, 
California could not only maintain the insurance program as self-sup- 
porting, but could also exceed the present level of benefit coverage.p2 
Further, it cannot be seriously argued that the program was adequate 
when Geduldig arose. It provided basic benefits ranging from $25 to 
$105 per week. If the disability required hospitalization, an additional 
$12 per day was paid to the disabled," but the hospital costs in California 
averaged over $149 per day in 1 972.64 In summary, California could 
- .- 
55404 U.S. at 76. 
56417 U.S. at 496. 
57417 U.S. at 494 n.18. 
58417 U.S. at 499 n.l,505. 
59Under the present program, a person earning $5,000 must contribute 1 percent of his 
annual wages or $50. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 499 n.1. If California were to cover 
pregnancy-related disabilities, the individual would have to pay 1.364 percent of his annual 
income, which amounts to $68.20, an increase of $18.20 per year or approximately $1.50 per 
month. 
Goprior to 1974, the maximum annual premium an individual had to pay was $85. 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 499 n.1. If California were to cover pregnancy-related dis- 
abilities, the most an individual would be required to pay is $1 19, or a yearly increase of $34, 
which is a monthly increase of approximately $2.83 per month. An individual who paid less 
than $85 prior to 1974 would have his premiums increased by .364 percent. This always works 
out to less than $2.83 per month. 
G141 7 U.S. at 496. 
62417 U.S. at 505; Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. at 798. 
6 3 C ~ ~ .  UNEMP. INS. CODE 9s 2655,2801 (West 1972). 
6 4 B u ~ ~ ~ u  OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL BSTRACT 1974, at 72 (95th 
ed.). 
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easily have expanded insurance coverage to normal pregnancy-related 
disabilities and still maintained its interests in prohibiting burdensome 
contributions, continuing the program as self-supporting and providing 
the same level of benefits. 
In cases where the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review is inap- 
plicable, the Supreme Court has traditionally interpreted the fourteenth 
amendment as allowing the states great leeway in establishing social pro- 
grams.65 Certainly, the amendment cannot be read to require a state to 
establish a maternity insurance program and to tax its citizens in support 
of such a program. The Court has said: 
[A] State "may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the 
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. . . . The legisla- 
ture may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglect- 
ing the others."66 
Nevertheless, California's insurance program covers all disabilities 
that require hospitalization except one - the disability resulting from a 
normal pregnan~y.~' Exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities 
amounts to a saving of less than $2.83 per month for the average worker 
and can hardly be considered to bear a fair and substantial relationship to 
a goal of avoiding burdensome insurance premiums, particularly in light 
of the coverage provided for voluntary and involuntary male sex-related 
disabilities.68 The Reed decision would seem to proscribe discrimina- 
tion against pregnant women for such a slight sum. 
Because the majority denied that the exclusion of pregnancy-related 
disabilities was sex discrimination, the Court did not specify a standard 
of judicial review to be applied in future sex discrimination conflicts. 
Nevertheless, the Geduldig decision will affect prospective sex discrimi- 
nation litigation. In Communication Workers of America v .  A TQT,69 
the district court utilized the Geduldig rationale to hold that an em- 
ployer's disparate treatment of pregnant employees did not, in and of 
65Cases cited note 5 1 supra. 
66Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 495 (citations omitted). 
67 
While the act technically excludes from coverage individuals under court commitment for 
dipsomania, drug addiction, or sexual psychopathy, UNEMP. INS. CODE # 2678, the [Su- 
preme] Court was informed by the Deputy Attorney General of California at oral argu- 
ment that court commitment for such disabilities is "a fairly archaic practice" and that 
"it would be unrealistic to say that they constitute valid exclusions." 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 499 n.3. 
68Some examples are: prostatectomies and circumcisions, sex change operations, vasectomies, 
and hemophilia. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 501, Brief for Appellees supra note 36 at 21, 
23. 
692 CCH EMP. PRACT. G. (8 EPD) 9615. at 5637 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2,1974). 
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itself, violate the ban on sex discrimination contained in Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.70 The court stated: 
The threshold question is whether disparity of treatment between 
pregnancy-related disabilities can be classified as discrimination based on 
sex. If, as footnote 20 [in Geduldig] seems to suggest, it cannot be so 
classified, then the further question of whether such disparity is justified 
- or less justified in the employment context than in some other context 
- can never be reached.'l 
Thus, pregnant women appear to have lost the protection formerly 
guaranteed them under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This 
need not have occurred. In allowing California to refuse to insure 
coverage for pregnancy, the Court did not have to deny that discrimina- 
tion against pregnant women is sex discrimination. 
Constitutional Law - MOOTNESS -DeFunis v .  Odegaard, 41 6 U.S. 3 12 
(1 974). 
Marco DeFunis applied for admission to the University of Washington 
Law School for the 197 1-72 school year but was denied admittance.' 
After his rejection, DeFunis, a white, learned that several minority appli- 
cants had been preferentially considered and accepted with lower 
academic qualifications than his.2 
DeFunis commenced an action in a Washington state court seeking to 
compel his admission. The trial court granted DeFunis a temporary 
injunction allowing him to enter law school in September of 197 1, and 
subsequently ruled that the admissions procedures violated the equal 
protection clause.3 The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the 
lower court, ruling DeFunis had not demonstrated, as a matter of fact, 
that the law school's admissions procedures were unconstitutional.4 The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari5 and the judgment of 
-- - 
7042 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2(a) (1970). 
CCH EMP. PRACT. G. at 5639. 
'The class was to be limited to 150 students; 1601 applications were received. 416 U.S. 312, 
314 (1974). 
2Certain minority groups are given preferential treatment by the admissions committee. 
These groups include Black, Chicano, Native, and Filipino Americans. In determining the 
probability of success in law school, less weight was placed on the grade-point averages and 
admission test scores of members of these groups than of other applicants. DeFunis v. Ode- 
gaard, 82 Wash. 2d 1121,507 P.2d 1169,1175 (1973) (en banc). 
3DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741727 (Wash. Super. Ct. King Co. 1971) (oral decision), found 
in 1 A. GINGER, DEFUNIS VERSUS ODEGAARD AND THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, THE UNIVER- 
SITY ADMISSIONS CASE 1 15 (1974). 
482 Wash. 2d 11,507 P.2d 1169 (1973) (en banc). 
5414 U.S. 1038 (1973). 
